The malicious versions were released on July 14, 2026, involving approximately 90 minutes This article explores malicious versions released. . Affected packages include @asyncapi/specs v6.11.2-alpha.1 and v6.11.2, @asyncapi/generator@3.3.1, @asyncapi/generator-components@0.7.1, and @asyncapi/generator-helpers@1.1.1.
This incident is noteworthy because @asyncapi/specs acts as a transitive dependency for numerous AsyncAPI tools, potentially reaching developer systems, CI/CD runners, container builds, and production environments that installed or imported the compromised versions. Instead of directly infiltrating npm, the threat actor exploited its legitimate release process by publishing poisoned packages through GitHub OpenID Connect, under the identity npm-oidc-no-reply@github.com. This incident highlights that while provenance signatures confirm where and how an artifact was constructed, they cannot independently verify that a trusted repository or release workflow has not already been compromised.
Persistence mechanisms included a Windows Registry Run key named "miasma-monitor," a Linux systemd user service called "miasma-monitor.service," and shell profile modifications on macOS. Potential targets included GitHub tokens, NPM tokens, AWS access keys, Azure client secrets, Google Cloud service account credentials, Docker tokens, Kubernetes credentials, SSH private keys, .npmrc files, and HashiCorp Vault tokens. Updating containers, golden images, and CI runners from known-good dependency baselines is crucial for preventing poisoned caches or persistence mechanisms from spreading into future builds.
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